Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 14,232
Cover Image
Bluffing and strategic reticence in prediction markets
Chen, Yiling; Reeves, Daniel M.; Pennock, David M.; … - In: Internet and network economics : third international …, (pp. 70-81). 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003648609
Cover Image
Maintaining equilibria during exploration in sponsored search auctions
Wortmann, Jennifer; Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy; Li, Lihong; … - In: Internet and network economics : third international …, (pp. 119-130). 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003648640
Cover Image
Equilibrium analysis of dynamic bidding in sponsored search auctions
Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy; Reeves, Daniel M. - In: Internet and network economics : third international …, (pp. 155-166). 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003648667
Cover Image
Market equilibrium using auctions for a class of gross-substitute utilities
Garg, Rahul; Kapoor, Sanjiv - In: Internet and network economics : third international …, (pp. 356-361). 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003648967
Cover Image
Equilibria in multi-unit discriminatory auctions
Anwar, Ahmed W. (contributor) - In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics 7 (2007) 1, pp. 1-16
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003738108
Cover Image
Endogenous entry equilibrium in auctions and markets with standards
Pevnitskaya, Svetlana A. - 2001
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003777596
Cover Image
Competition between market making intermediaries
Lörtscher, Simon - 2006 - 1. Aufl.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003284138
Cover Image
Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions
Lebrun, Bernard - In: Games and economic behavior 55 (2006) 1, pp. 131-151
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003309940
Cover Image
All-pay auction equilibria in contests
Alcalde, José; Dahm, Matthias - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003848506
Cover Image
Collusion via resale
Garratt, Rod - 2008
The English auction is susceptible to tacit collusion when post-auction inter-bidder resale is allowed. We show this by constructing equilibria where, with positive probability, one bidder wins the auction without any competition and divides the spoils by optimally reselling the good to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003850403