In this paper we consider the problem of the control of access to a firm's productive asset, embedding the relevant decisionmakers into a general structure of formal authority relations. Within such an authority structure, each decision maker acts as a principal to some decision makers, while...

Power is a core concept in the analysis and design of organisations. In this paper we consider positional power in hierarchies. One of the problems with the extant literature on positional power in hierarchies is that it is mainly restricted to the analysis of power in terms of the bare...

In this laboratory experiment we study the use of strategic ignorance to delegate real authority within a firm. A worker can gather information on investment projects, while a manager makes the implementation decision. The manager can monitor the worker. This allows her to better exploit the...

In diesem Beitrag geht es um die Effekte des Fehlens und die Möglichkeit des Entstehens einer normativ anspruchsvollen politischen Öffentlichkeit, welche weitreichend sind. So lässt sich die gegenwärtige Krise der Global Governance und des globalen politischen Systems auf das Fehlen einer...

This paper discusses the concept of authority in global governance by unpacking the components that characterize its various notions. These components are the triadic relationship between power, legitimacy, and the reference to public interests, and how they are embedded in the constellation...

Der Beitrag attestiert den gegenwärtig viel diskutierten Theorien radikaler Demokratie eine erziehungstheoretische Leerstelle. Wie in Auseinandersetzung mit Chantal Mouffe und Jacques Rancière gezeigt werden soll, gründet diese Nichtthematisierung in erster Linie in der...

We formalize a conception of authority, which is commonly defined as the right of controlling a person’s actions embedded in human assets in sociology. Due to the inalienable property of human assets, the contractible formal authority is hard to verify and enforce, while real authority usually...

This paper presents a theory of the allocation of authority in an organization in which centralization is limited by the agent's ability to disobey the principal. We show that workers are given more authority when they are costly to replace or do not mind looking for another job, even if they...