We identify investor moral hazard in the German fiscal federation. Our identification strategy is based on a variable, which was used by the German Federal Constitutional Court as an indicator to determine eligibility of two German states (Länder) to a bail-out, the interest payments-to-revenue...

Die bestehenden Regeln zur Begrenzung der Staatsverschuldung im föderalen System Deutschlands sind unzureichend. Eine Aufteilung der Maastricht-Kriterien auf die Gebietskörperschaften setzt keine Anreize zur Vermeidung der Neuverschuldung, sofern die Obergrenzen erfüllt sind. Wir schlagen...

In the context of EMU fiscal equalization schemes have been proposed as a means to stabilize regions against asymmetric shocks. A theoretical analysis shows that besides reducing the cross-sectional income variance the redistributive element of fiscal equalization causes incentive effects for...

In this paper we use a simple bureaucracy model of fiscal illusion to analyze the impact of intergovernmental grants on the cost efficiency of local jurisdictions. We find that a higher degree of redistribution within a system of fiscal equalization or an increase in the amount of grants...