Der Geschäftsführer im Konzern steht nicht nur in seiner Führungsrolle im Fokus. Auch seine (rechtliche) Verankerung im Unternehmen ist anspruchsvoll in der Regelung. Das Werk erläutert praxisnah alle wichtigen Fragen.

This paper investigates the strategic value of the managerial incentive scheme in affecting firms' incentive in R&D investment and their product market activities. Firstly, we find that in Cournot-quantity competition, owners strategically assign a non-profit-maximization objective to their...

We model a situation where a leader appearing to seek advises from expert may be of two types: an objective type who is genuinely seeking advise for action, and a biased type who is predetermined to certain action while pretending to seek advises for a reputation of being open-minded. To...

This paper investigates the effects of regulatory interventions on contracting relationships within firms by examining the impacts of the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act on CEO compensation. Using panel data of the S&P 1500 firms, it quantifies welfare gains from a principal–agent model with hidden...

Prior research finds that firms tend to select external CEO hires from companies with superior past performance and that this past performance is associated with a compensation premium in the hiring firm. We test whether this pay premium is associated with future performance in the hiring firm....

How to address managerial short-termism is an important issue for companies, regulators, and researchers. We examine the effect of CEO contractual protection, in the form of employment agreements and severance pay agreements, on managerial short-termism. We find that firms with CEO contractual...