In this article, a modelling framework for the information transmission between agents in an evolutionary game setting is proposed. Agents observe traits which reflect past and present behaviour and success of other agents. If agents imitate more successful agents based on these traits, the...

We consider a principal-agent relationship in which two tasks need to be carried out. Each task involves a decision. The principal can neither contract on the two decisions nor on the benefit which she receives from them but only on a signal, which simultaneously reflects both. We show that the...

We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...

This article considers a wide class of censoring problems and presents a construction rule for an objective function. This objective function generalises the orginary likelihood as well as particular "likelihoods" used for estimation in several censoring models. Under regularity conditions the...

Bubbles in asset markets have been documented in numerous experimental studies. However, all experiments in which bubbles occur pay dividends after each trading day. In this paper we study whether bubbles can occur in markets without dividends. We investigate the role of two features that are...

A standard hidden information model is considered to study the influence of the a priori productivity distribution on the optimal contract. A priori more productive (hazard rate dominant) agents work less, enjoy lower rents, but generate a higher expected surplus.

We investigate a team setting in which workers have different degrees of commitment to the outcome of their work. We show that if there are complementarities in production and if the team manager has some information about team members, interventions that the manager undertakes in order to...

We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...

What is the motivational effect of imposing a minimum effort requirement? Agents may no longer exert voluntary effort but merely meet the requirement. Here, we examine how such hidden costs of control change when control is considered legitimate. We study a principal-agent model where control...