In an auction market, the auctioneer exerts significant influence in choosing and administering a selling strategy. We make the case for viewing the auctioneer as a market maker, whose success depends on how well he manages externalities without jeopardizing the trust of the buyers and sellers....

When a principal’s monitoring information is private (non-verifiable), the agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information to reduce the agent’s wage or collect a monetary penalty. Restoring credibility may lead to an extreme waste of resources - the so-called...

We study an economy in which large technology companies, Big Techs (BTs), provide credit to firms operating on their platforms. We focus on two advantages that BTs have with respect to banks: better information on their clients and better enforcement of credit repayment since BTs can exclude a...

A principal hires an agent to learn about the cost of a project (experimentation) and then to execute it (production). The agent is privately informed about the probability that the cost is low, with the high-type agent being relatively more optimistic than the low type. The agent also engages...

We study an economy in which large technology companies, big techs, provide credit to rms operating on their platforms. We focus on the trade-o⁄ between privacy and e¢ ciency in the interaction between big tech and bank lending. Big techs have access to troves of data on rms who trade on...

We study the problem of multiple financiers who want to extract income from a privately informed agent and design their financial contracts non-cooperatively. Our analysis reveals that the degree of coordination between financiers has strong implications for the shapes of financial contracts....