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Efficiency and collusion neutrality of solutions for cooperative TU-games

Brink, René van den - 2009

Three well-known solutions for cooperative TU-games are the Shapley value, the Banzhaf value and the equal division solution. In the literature various axiomatizations of these solutions can be found. Axiomatizations of the Shapley value often use efficiency which is not satisfied by the Banzhaf...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378796

Game Theory Solution for Imposing Cartel Fines under Article 101 : Shapley Value Method

Jablonskis, Martynas - 2022

The article proposes a new method of attributing liability and calculating fines for cartel infringements. It borrows … Shapley value for calculating cartel fines. Shapley value itself is a well-established result in cooperative game theory. The … cartel can be thought of as coalition and cartel fines as Shapley allocations. The new approach also justifies liability for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013293989

Auctioning and selling positions : a non-cooperative approach to queuing conflicts

Brink, René van den; Chun, Youngsub; Ju, Yuan - 2014

Complementary to the axiomatic and mechanism design studies on queueing problems, this paper proposes a strategic bargaining approach to resolve queueing conflicts. Given a situation where players with different waiting costs have to form a queue in order to be served, they firstly compete with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010238945

Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities

Borm, Peter; Ju, Yuan; Wettstein, David - In: Journal of economic theory 157 (2015), pp. 236-254

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011525259

Efficient coalition-proof full implementation

Safronov, Mikhail - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011455985

Auctioning and selling positions : a non-cooperative approach to queueing conflicts

Ju, Yuan; Chun, Youngsub; Brink, René van den - In: Journal of economic theory 153 (2014), pp. 33-45

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010479521

Collusive behavior of bidders in english auctions : a cooperative game theoretic analysis

Oishi, Takayuki - In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics 10 (2010) 1, pp. 1-13

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009544998

Centrality rewarding shapley and Myerson values for undirected graph games

Chmelnitskaja, Anna B.; Laan, Gerard van der; Talman, Dolf - 2016

In this paper we introduce two values for cooperative games with communication graph structure. For cooperative games the shapley value distributes the worth of the grand coalition amongst the players by taking into account the worths that can be obtained by any coalition of players, but does...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011531120

Sharing the costs of complex water projects : application to the West Delta water conservation and irrigation rehabilitation project, Egypt

Moretti, Stefano; Patrone, Fioravante; Dinar, Ariel; … - In: Games 7 (2016) 3, pp. 1-23

Effective sharing mechanisms of joint costs among beneficiaries of a project are a fundamental requirement for the sustainability of the project. Projects that are heterogeneous both in terms of the landscape of the area under development or the participants (users) lead to a more complicated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515643

On the impossibility of fair risk allocation

Csóka, Péter; Pintér, Miklós - In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics 16 (2016) 1, pp. 143-158

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011431331

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