We propose a formal concept of the power of voice in the context of a simple model where individuals form groups and trade in competitive markets. Individuals use outside options in two different ways. Actual outside options reflect the possibility to exit or to join other existing groups....

This paper explores the possibility of privately inefficient job separations due to bargaining friction and its implications for the unemployment dynamics. I propose a simple specification of bargaining friction by including bargaining wedges in the standard Nash bargaining model. Such...

In 2005, competition was introduced in part of the hospital market in the Netherlands. Using a unique dataset of transactions and list prices between hospitals and insurers in the years 2005 and 2006, we estimate the influence of buyer and seller concentration on the negotiated prices. First, we...

This paper endogenizes policymaking procedures in a multilateral bargaining framework. A procedure specifies players' proposal power in bargaining over one-dimensional policies. In procedural bargaining players internalize the procedures' effects on subsequent policy bargaining. In policy...

We examine the relations between recent board declassifications, takeover activity and takeover gains over the period 2003-2011. We report that firms that declassified their boards in the previous five years are more likely to be the target of a takeover than other firms. We also report that...

This paper investigates the issue of strategic delegation by considering the role of management centrality in contracting with different stakeholders. Specifically, a sequential negotiation unionized duopoly model is analysed, in which the management relative bargaining power visà-vis...

The decision of the Court of Appeal in the unconscionable bargain case of Nicols v Jessup [1986] BCL 1573 helps to clarify the approach which New Zealand courts should take on unconscionability cases in light of the Privy Council decision in O'Connor v Hart [1985] 1 NZLR 159

We provide a theoretical framework for understanding tacit agreements — agreements that are spontaneously understood even if they are not explicitly stated. To examine tacit agreements, we develop a general formal account of “virtual bargaining” — a mode of reasoning that joins elements...