We examine institutional investors' preferences for corporate governance mechanisms. We find little evidence of an association between total institutional ownership and governance mechanisms. However, using revealed preferences, we identify a small group of ldquo;governance-sensitiverdquo;...

We examine whether companies select compensation peer groups opportunistically to increase CEO pay. Using 608 firms from the Samp;P 1500, 2,154 peer firms identified from their proxy statements, and a pool of potential peers representing the firm's labor market in which it competes for talent,...

This paper estimates the risk premium in CEO incentive compensation. Using detailed U.S. CEO contract compensation data and simulation analysis, we find that CEOs with riskier pay packages are paid more. The estimated risk premium from total incentive pay represents 15% of total pay. We further...

As restricted stock is increasingly important in compensation packages, understanding its unique institutional features becomes paramount. We study the interplay between tax and incentive attributes to show how management appears to be utilizing a unique tax election to generate firm benefits....