Pay transparency and the pay dispersion it reveals matter to academics, policymakers, and corporate stakeholders. We study how the increased pay transparency brought about by the United States’ CEO pay ratio disclosure rule affected employee pay satisfaction. Economic models of pay...

We examine whether compensation consultants' potential cross-selling incentives explain more lucrative CEO pay packages using 755 firms from the Samp;P 1500 for 2006. Critics allege that these incentives lead consultants to bias their advice to secure greater revenues from their clients (Waxman,...

We examine institutional investors' preferences for corporate governance mechanisms. We find little evidence of an association between total institutional ownership and governance mechanisms. However, using revealed preferences, we identify a small group of ldquo;governance-sensitiverdquo;...

We examine whether companies select compensation peer groups opportunistically to increase CEO pay. Using 608 firms from the Samp;P 1500, 2,154 peer firms identified from their proxy statements, and a pool of potential peers representing the firm's labor market in which it competes for talent,...

We examine the extent to which participation constraints influence CEO annual equity grants. Studying CEO equity grants over the period 2006-2016 and using equity grants to compensation peers as a proxy for the reservation equity grant level, we find that the reservation wage in equity is a...

We study whether executives receive pay premiums for the uncertainty of their match with a new firm. Using changes in executive-firm matches from ExecuComp, we document that executives receive significant attraction premiums when they move to new firms. These premiums vary with proxies that...

We examine how competition in supplier industries affects CEO incentive intensity in procuring firms. Using the Input-Output Accounts Data (IO Data) published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), we compute a weighted supplier industry competition measure. We then predict and find that...