Obwohl heute ein weitgehender Konsens darüber vorliegt, dass der Qualitätssicherung bei Humandienstleistungen ein ganz besonderer Stellenwert zukommt, fehlt eine systematische Auseinandersetzung mit den Gründen und Möglichkeiten einer solchen Qualitätssicherung. Am Beispiel der Bildung,...

The information asymmetries inherent in credence goods have typically led economists to conclude these markets require well-defined quality standards and third-party verification that producers are meeting those standards. Nonetheless, many producers of credence goods appear to be opting out of...

This paper studies the interaction of information disclosure and reputational concerns in certification markets. We argue that by revealing less precise information a certifier reduces the threat of capture. Opaque disclosure rules may reduce profits but also constrain feasible bribes. For large...

This paper studies the effect of a minimum quality standard, a compulsory labeling scheme, and the combination of both instruments in a vertical differentiation model when not all quality dimensions of products can be observed byconsumers. Both a minimum quality standard on the non-observable...