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Dynamic contracting with long-term consequences : optimal CEO compensation and turnover

Vasama, Suvi - 2016

We examine optimal managerial compensation and turnover policy in a principal-agent model in which the firm output is serially correlated over time. The model captures a learning-by-doing feature: higher effort by the manager increases the quality of the match between the firm and the manager in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011550469

Designing bankers' pay : using contingent capital to reduce risk-shifting incentives

Hilscher, Jens; Peleg Lazar, Sharon; Raviv, Alon - In: The Quarterly Journal of Finance : QJF 12 (2022) 1, pp. 2240005-1-2240005-22

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013174947

Managerial capital and the market for CEOs

Murphy, Kevin James (contributor); … - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003401915

Market for CEO talent, determinants and consequences

Ullah, Saif - In: International review of financial analysis 63 (2019), pp. 395-405

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012208180

Optimal contracts with a risk-taking agent

Barron, Daniel; Georgiadis, George; Swinkels, Jeroen M. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 2, pp. 715-761

Consider an agent who can costlessly add mean-preserving noise to his output. To deter such risk-taking, the principal … optimally offers a contract that makes the agent's utility concave in output. If the agent is risk-neutral and protected by … limited liability, this concavity constraint binds and so linear contracts maximize profit. If the agent is risk averse, the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308620

Essays on financial incentives, moral hazard, and risk-sharing in the presence of other-regarding preferences

Neuß, Stefan Gregor - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011610671

Essay on household financial and career decisions

Barth, Daniel - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011815570

Optimal contracting under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties

Sung, Jaeyoung - In: Economic theory 74 (2022) 2, pp. 593-642

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013442066

Risk-sharing and optimal contracts with large exogenous risks

Martin, Jessica; Villeneuve, Stéphane - In: Decisions in economics and finance : a journal of … 46 (2023) 1, pp. 1-43

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014321356

You don't always get what you pay for

Schnedler, Wendelin - 2007

Consider a principal-agent relationship in which more effort by the agent raises the likelihood of success. Does rewarding success, i.e., paying a bonus, increase effort in this case? I find that bonuses have not only an incentive but also an income effect. Overall, bonuses paid for success may...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003592884