The paper studies agents' general or specific investment decisions under different ownership structures in a thin, decentralized market where each agent's decision affects the decisions and welfare of other agents mainly through indirect market linkages. It focuses on the roles of both...

Abstract We study models of the formation of citation networks in a setting where authors/firms care about their citations and are rational. The effect of these two features on the diffusion of useful ideas in a setting with complete information about past citations leads to multiplicity of...

This paper studies a game of attack and interception in a network, where a single attacker chooses a target and a path, and each node chooses a level of protection. We show that the Nash equilibrium of the game exists and is unique. We characterize equilibrium attack paths and attack...

We address the issue of bidder ring formation in single and multi-unit Vickrey auctions. We address this issue in a bargaining game set up under the assumption that valuation of bidders is commonly known only amongst themselves. In the single unit case, we show that the equilibrium coalition...

Pre-electoral coalitions occur frequently in parliamentary democracies. They influence post election coalition formation and surplus division. We study a game theoretic model where political parties can form coalitions both before (ex ante) and after (ex post) the elections. Ex ante coalitions...