In the present paper we discuss the notion of values for games with coalition structure, applying the approach suggested by Hart and Mas-Colell (1985) concerning the consistency property and the potential function. An axiomatic formulation of the values by this approach leads to two known values...

The multilinear extension has been shown to be an effective tool for computing the Shapley value of an n-person game. We modify here the method of the multilinear extension to calculate the modified (coalition) value for such games.

In a sequential bargaining model of coalition formation and payoff M division players form demands for their participation in a coalition. These M demands have some appealing, intuitive features. We characterize the sets of M semi-stable and stable demands vectors for general NTU games using M...

In this paper we analyze a simple non-cooperative bargaining model for coalition formation and payoff distribution for games in coalitional form. We show that under our bargaining regime a cooperative game is core-implementable and if it possesses the property of increasing returns to scale for...