Using perfectly competitive, general equilibrium models of international trade, specific import tariffs, specific export taxes, and ad valorem trade taxes are compared in a trade war. A trade war is modelled as a NE in trade policies, where each country can choose to use ad valorem trade taxes...

Taxation under oligopoly is analysed in a general equilibrium setting where the firms are large relative to the size of the economy and maximise the utility of their shareholders. It turns out that the model is an aggregative game, which simplifies the comparative statics for the effects of...

We provide a mechanism that approximately implements the Mas-Colell bargaining set in subgame perfect equilibrium. The mechanism is based on the definition of the Mas-Colell bargaining set, and respects feasibility in and out of equilibrium.

Taxation under oligopoly is analysed in a general equilibrium setting where the firms are large relative to the size of the economy and maximise the utility of their shareholders. It turns out that the model is an aggregative game, which simplifies the comparative statics for the effects of...

We study dominant strategy implementation especially in economic environments. We first showthat in general environments, strategy-proofness and quasi-strong-non-bossiness together are necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementation via the associated direct revelationmechanism. We...

In an infinite-time decentralized sequence economy, agents use fiat money to bridge markets as if they make trades in a centralized economy, to avoid huge transaction cost that all agents' going together must incur. The model in this paper formulates the process how agents decide the fiat...

Combining the approaches of Ortiz and Mejía et al., this paper proposes a new model of drug trafficking and conflict. In a general equilibrium framework, an explanation of the downward trend in the price of cocaine over the last two decades is developed. The model shows that the main factor...

Competition among banks promotes growth and stability for an economy with production externality. Following Arrow and Debreu (1954), I formulate a standard growth model with externality — a two-period version of Romer (1986) — as a game among consumers, firms, and intermediaries. The...

This paper mainly addresses why people are rationally willing to cooperate with one another to accept fiat money from the perspective of decentralized sequential general equilibrium framework by using dynamic game to determine agents' expectation of nominal prices in unrevealed future. The model...

This paper mainly addresses why people are rationally willing to cooperate with one another to accept fiat money from the perspective of decentralized sequential general equilibrium framework by using dynamic game to determine agents' expectation of nominal prices in unrevealed future. The model...