Generic efficiency and collusion-proofness in exchange economies
Year of publication: |
2001-04
|
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Authors: | GIRAUD, Gaël ; ROCHON, Céline |
Institutions: | Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain |
Subject: | coalition-proofness | Bayesian implementation | communication equilibrium | interim efficiency |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | The text is part of a series UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Number 2001019 |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D51 - Exchange and Production Economies |
Source: |
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Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies
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Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies
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Generic efficiency and collusion-proofness in exchange economies
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Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies
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