This paper develops a mechanism design approach to study externalities and re-distribution. The mechanism screens individuals’ social weights to strike a balance among broad distributional objectives, incentives to work, and incentives to reduce externalities. The welfare-optimal allocation...

We investigate how heterogeneous social preferences affect the communication of painful information in social relationships. We characterize the existence conditions for a pooling equilibrium in which individuals conceal painful information because revealing the latter would signal that they are...

Indicated key external and internal threats have a profound effect on the process of ensuring the financial security of the enterprise. Therefore, the important step is the application the mechanism of counteraction to the influence of external and internal threats. The mechanism for countering...

Künstliche Intelligenz (KI) scheint den derzeitigen Rechtsrahmen infrage zu stellen, wenn Regeln aus einer analogen Welt auf Rechtsfragen des digitalen Zeitalters angewendet werden. Dies macht sich insbesondere dann bemerkbar, wenn KI-Systeme Schäden verursachen. Die akademische...

The authors of the article point out that the theory of economics has failed to yield a solid theoretical background in such critical situations as the transformational period of post-communist economies and the period of the current financial and economic crisis. While classical liberal or...

This study assessed the asymmetry in the causal and dispositional attributions for a company’s failures and successes from the perspective of an external observer in the context of morality- vs. competence-related events. Eight hundred respondents participated in a five-factor experiment...

We study the importance of information technology (IT) in banking for entrepreneurship. Guided by a parsimonious model, we establish that job creation by young firms is stronger in US counties more exposed to banks with greater IT adoption. We present evidence consistent with banks’ IT...

This paper considers competitive search equilibrium in a market for a good whose quality differs across sellers. Each seller knows the quality of the good that he or she is offering for sale, but buyers cannot observe quality directly. We thus have a “market for lemons” with competitive...

This paper considers competitive search equilibrium in a market for a good whose quality differs across sellers. Each seller knows the quality of the good that he or she is offering for sale, but buyers cannot observe quality directly. We thus have a "market for lemons" with competitive search...

We consider a monopolistic certifier selling certification services to a partially privately informed seller. The certifier can enable the seller to disclose her private information publicly, as well as gather additional market information about the good's quality publicly. We show that the...