In this paper we highlight the importance of the operational costs in explaining economic growth and analyze how the industrial structure affects the growth rate of the economy. If there is monopolistic competition only in an intermediate goods sector, then production growth coincides with...

The objective of this work is to study the impact of the unions bargaining power on production and wages. We present a model where a competitive final good is produced through two substitutable intermediate goods, one produced by unskilled labor and the other by skilled labor. Potential workers...

In this paper we study the relationship between unions and growth in a two-sector overlapping generations model with altruism and human capital. This relationship depends on the interaction between the technology in the sector that produces human capital, the degree of unionization of the...

We consider a multilateral bargaining game in which the agents can be classified into two groups according to their instantaneous preferences. In one of these groups there is one agent with a different discount factor. We analyze how this time-preference heterogeneity may generate multiplicity...

This study analyzes the efficiency of equilibria in a multilateral bargaining game in which a legislature divides its budget among collective and particularistic goods. In order to disentangle the causes of inefficiency, we extend the model of Volden and Wiseman (Am Polit Sci Rev 101:79–92, <CitationRef...</citationref>

This paper analyzes the investment decisions of the members of a committee when a subsequent bargaining process determines the distribution of a divisible good among them. The shares allocated to investing agents generate positive consumption externalities. We show that agents’ investments...

We analyze a rent-seeking contest that determines the bargaining protocol in a one-dimensional bargaining game, where agents preferences over social outcomes are single-peaked. We relate the incentives of agents to make unproductive and costly efforts/investments to the quota rules that are...

In the setting of a one-dimensional legislative bargaining game, we characterize qualified majority rules maximizing social surplus, that is, the sum of individual benefits. The simple majority rule maximizes social surplus when individual utilities are tent-shaped. When the utilities are...

This note analyzes the efficiency properties of the equilibrium in a multilateral bargaining game in which a legislature divides a budget among collective and particularistic goods. We extend the model of Volden and Wiseman (2007) by considering smooth utility functions and consensus...