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Limited Liability and Option Contracts in Models with Sequential Investments
Lülfesmann, Christoph - University of Bonn, Germany - 2001
The paper investigates a model where two parties sequentially invest in a joint project (an asset). Investments and the project value are unverifiable, and A is wealth constrained so that an initial outlay must be financed by either agent B or an external investor C, say a bank. We show that an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968392
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Benevolent government, managerial incentives, and the virtues of privatization
Lülfesmann, Christoph - 2002
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001710388
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Limited liability and option contracts in models with sequential investments
Lülfesmann, Christoph - 2001
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001642003
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Self-correcting mechanisms in public procurement : why award and contract should be seperated
Bös, Dieter; Kolmar, Martin - 2000
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001510204
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Strategic defection in bilateral trade
Lülfesmann, Christoph - 2001
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001567031
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Strategic Shirking in Bilateral Trade
Luelfesmann, Christoph - Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University - 2007
This paper explores a version of the canonical holdup model where agents undertake specific investments prior to their transaction. In this setting, we identify a novel reason for contractual inefficiency. An investing party (here, the seller) may shirk for strategic reasons, in particular,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005597138
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Holdups, Quality Choice, and the Achilles' Heel in Government Contracting
Bös, Dieter; Lülfesmann, Christoph - 2001
This paper investigates a procurement relationship between a welfare-oriented government and a private supplier. The … procurement where the buyer maximizes profit rather than welfare. We identify the government's welfare objective as its Achilles …' heel: equilibrium trade prices differ in public and private procurement, and private governance can lead to more efficient …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317648
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Holdups, quality choice, and the Achilles' heel in government contracting
Bös, Dieter; Lülfesmann, Christoph - 2001
This paper investigates a procurement relationship between a welfare-oriented government and a private supplier. The … procurement where the buyer maximizes profit rather than welfare. We identify the government's welfare objective as its Achilles …' heel: equilibrium trade prices differ in public and private procurement, and private governance can lead to more efficient …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539057
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Holdups, Quality Choice, and the Achilles' Heel in Government Contracting
Bös, Dieter; Lülfesmann, Christoph - University of Bonn, Germany - 2001
This paper investigates a procurement relationship between a welfare-oriented government and a private supplier. The … procurement where the buyer maximizes profit rather than welfare. We identify the government's welfare objective as its Achilles …' heel: equilibrium trade prices differ in public and private procurement, and private governance can lead to more efficient …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968417
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Joint Ventures as a Commitment Device Against Lobbies
Berardi, Nicoletta; Seabright, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
lobbying pressure are more likely than other firms to choose joint ventures as their corporate governance structure. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468544