We show that when a seller of a differentiated good offers the product allowing consumers an option to pay what they like, then all consumers will never free ride in equilibrium when their valuations of the good are positive, and, under certain conditions, all will consumers would pay. Further,...

This paper analyses lawyer's choices of law in international sales contracts. It identifies key reasons for opting in or out of the CISG across different jurisdictions. The paper then examines aspects of this choice from economic and psychological perspectives: from the ability to externalize...

We consider a supply chain where an OEM (manufacturer) sources a component from multiple suppliers. OEM uses the component to make a product that he then sells to end customers. When a component fails in the field, warranty costs are incurred. The focus of the paper is to examine various...

This paper offers a theoretical model for the analysis of illegal cartels. Given the nature of the cartel, retaliation is also illegal. To assess the stability of collusion as a criminal organization, we propose a one-shot game based on Bertrand competition with product differentiation. We...

In this paper, game theory is applied to the case of price wars in a market scenario game towards a converging solution of Nash equilibrium. This is done using the famous Bertrand Game, starting first with a simple version of a game involving two players with undifferentiated products who move...

There is mounting empirical evidence to suggest that the law of one price is violated in retail financial markets: there is significant price dispersion even when products are homogeneous. Also, despite the large number of firms in the market, prices remain above marginal cost and may even rise...

In a typical corporate hierarchy, the manager is delegated the authority to make decisions that set directions for the organization, employ subordinates and contract with external suppliers. This paper explains when such delegation of authority can be optimal, using a model of a firm with three...

It is shown that asymmetry in Ramp;D efficiency between firms is an important factor determining feasibility of the preemption and attrition scenarios in competitive Ramp;D with time to build. Scenarios of attrition and preemption games are most likely to occur when competitors have similar...

There are many situations in which a customer's proclivity to buy the product of any firm depends not only on the classical attributes oft he product such as its price and quality, but also on who else is buying the same product. We model these situations as games in which firms compete for...