This paper studies the influence of interregional inequality within countries on internal con-flicts. Regional inequalities are measured by the population-weighted coefficient of variation of regional GDP per capita. As the main innovation, I use a panel data set of country-level re- gional...

Although many real bargaining situations involve more than two people, much of the theoretical and experimental research concentrates on the two player situation. We study the simplest possible extension: four people (two two-person groups) of different patience bargain with each other....

We analyze the performance of various communication protocols in a generalization of the Crawford-Sobel (1982) model of cheap talk that allows for multiple receivers. We find that whenever the sender can communicate informatively with both receivers by sending private messages, she can...

This paper examines the implications that alternative regulatory structures may have for resolving failed banking institutions. We place our emphasis on the European Union (EU), which is both economically and financially large and has several features relating to cross-border banking in the form...

This paper examines the negative externalities that may occur when a large bank fails, describes the nature of those externalities, and explores whether they may be greater in a case involving a large cross-border banking organization. The analysis suggests that the chief negative externalities...

In the context of international bargaining, standard models predict that a shift in military power can cause preventive war because it changes the relative bargaining position between states. We find that shifts in military power are not the only cause of war under commitment problems and that...

Although many real bargaining situations involve more than two people, much of the theoretical and experimental research concentrates on the two player situation. We study the simplest possible extension: four people (two two-person groups) of different patience bargain with each other....

In the recent theoretical literature on lending risk, the coordination problem in multicreditor relationships have been analyzed extensively. We address this topic empirically, relying on a unique panel data set that includes detailed credit-file information on distressed lending relationships...

In international relations, short-run incentives for non-cooperation often dominate. Yet, (external) institutions for enforcing cooperation are hampered by national sovereignty, supposedly strengthening the role of selfenforcing mechanisms. This paper examines their scope with a focus on...

The results of empirical research on whether media attention encourages terrorism differ according to the study period. The present contribution identifies which episodes from 1970 to 2010 are characterized by Granger-causalities. Structural breaks are systematically taken into account, and both...