In this paper, we empirically assess the effects of the winner’s curse in auctions for road concession contracts. Such auctions are private- and common-value auctions, and they are on concession contracts which are incomplete contracts prone to pervasive renegotiations (Guasch 2004, Engel...

In this paper, we empirically assess the effects of the winner's curse in auctions for toll road concession contracts. Such auctions are common-value auctions for incomplete contracts prone to pervasive renegotiations. We address three questions in turn. First, we investigate the overall effects...

When an incumbent firm is in charge of a distribution network, it accumulates information on the state of the network. This `common value' information creates a winner's curse during auctions for renewing the concession. The municipality contracting out the provision of the service trades off...

When an incumbent firm is in charge of a distribution network, it accumulates information on the state of the network. This `common value' information creates a winner's curse during auctions for renewing the concession. The municipality contracting out the provision of the service trades off...

In this article, we explore the contractual design of toll infrastructure concession contracts. We highlight the fact that the contracting parties try to sign not only complete rigid contracts in order to avoid renegotiations but also flexible contracts in order to adapt contractual framework to...

We analyze the problem of a buyer who purchases a long-term project from one of several suppliers. A changing state of the world influences the costs of the suppliers. Complete contracts conditioning on all future realizations of the state are infeasible. We show that contractual incompleteness...

The paper starts with a description of major reforms of EU policy in the network industries. Based on the normative economics of regulation, it then points out generic information and transaction cost problems of regulatory policy making. An appropriate allocation of regulatory competencies may...

We study optimal procurement in the presence of default risk. Contractors differ in the penalty they suffer in case of default, which is private information. If the loss to the procurer from non-completion is high relative to the cost of completion, the optimal mechanism is to assign the project...

Das vorliegende Working Paper beinhaltet Vortragsmanuskripte zu drei Dissertationsprojekten, die in den Jahren 2002 und 2003 am Lehrstuhl erfolgreich abgeschlossen wurden. Es handelt sich dabei um die Arbeit von Dr. Klinke zum Finanzcontrolling in mittelständischen Bauunternehmen mit...

Das vorliegende Working Paper beinhaltet Vortragsmanuskripte zu drei Dissertationsprojekten, die in den Jahren 2002 und 2003 am Lehrstuhl erfolgreich abgeschlossen wurden. Es handelt sich dabei um die Arbeit von Dr. Klinke zum Finanzcontrolling in mittelständischen Bauunternehmen mit...