We set up a probabilistic voting model to explore the hypothesis that tax competition improves public sector efficiency and social welfare. In the absence of tax base mobility, distortions in the political process induce vote-maximising politicians to create rents to public sector employees....

In this paper fiscal policy is examined for an open economy characterised by unemployment due to efficiency wages. We allow for capital and firm mobility in a model where the government chooses the level of wage, source-based capital and profit taxation. The taxing choices of governments are...

This paper reviews the recent theoretical literature that analyzes the European Union's policy to eliminate preferential corporate-tax regimes and the proposal to introduce a consolidated EU tax base with formula apportionment for the taxation of multinational firms. Since neither proposal...

This article analyses the impact of EU structural policy on the economic development of German regions between 1995 and 2004. In this period East-German regions have converged, while regional disparities have been increasing in West-Germany. In addition East-German <roman>Landkreise</roman> have caught up with...

We set up a probabilistic voting model to explore the hypothesis that tax competition improves public sector efficiency and social welfare. In the absence of tax base mobility, distortions in the political process induce vote-maximising politicians to create rents to public sector employees....

Ergänzend zu dem im ifo Schnelldienst 11/2004 diskutierten Thema "Sollte die Unternehmensbesteuerung innerhalb der EU harmonisiert werden?" plädiert Prof. Dr. Christoph Spengel, Universität Gießen, für eine Angleichung der effektiven Unternehmenssteuerbelastungen innerhalb der EU. Dazu...

This paper compares property taxation to a corporate income tax based on formula apportionment in a model where identical countries compete to attract capital. We find that if countries can pair a residence-based capital tax with a property tax (source tax on capital) the tax equilibrium is...