In this article we report the results from a series of laboratory markets in which sellers have better information about the quality of an item than any of the potential buyers. Sellers may voluntarily choose to reveal this information or they may instead decide to "blind bid" the item. We find...

Most of the laboratory research in political science follows the style that was pioneered in experimental economics a half-century ago by Vernon Smith. The connection between this style of political science experimentation and economics experimentation parallels the connection between economic...

The authors examine a bargaining setting where heterogeneous buyers and sellers are repeatedly matched and time is costly. They characterize efficiency and then, using an implementation approach, study the allocations that can result in equilibrium when the matched buyers and sellers bargain...

We analyze a game of two-sided private information where players have privately known "strengths" and can decide to fight or compromise. If either chooses to fight, the stronger player receives a high payoff and the weaker player receives a low payoff. If both choose to compromise, each player...

This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candidate. The candidates care about winning and also have policy preferences. There is two-dimensional private information. Candidate ideal points as well...