When allocating indivisible objects, agents might have equal priority rights for some objects. A common practice is to break the ties using a lottery and randomize over deterministic allocation mechanisms. Such randomizations usually lead to unfairness and inefficiency ex-ante. We propose a...

The Public Choice Research Centre (PCRC) operated as the Academy of Finland's Centre of Excellence from 2008 to 2013. Its founding partners were University of Turku, Turku School of Economics and University of Hamburg. The focus of research of the Hamburg group was on three topics: voting power...

We consider house allocation problems (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) with strict preferences. We introduce a new axiom called pre-exchange-proofness, which states that no pair of agents gain by exchanging their endowments with each other prior to the operation of the chosen rule. We establish that a...

Weighted committee games generalize n-player simple voting games to m ≥ 3 alternatives. The committee's aggregation rule treats votes anonymously but parties, shareholders, members of supranational organizations, etc. differ in their numbers of votes. Infinitely many vote distributions induce...

Many public goods that are provided by coalitions have a group-size effect. Namely, people prefer to consume a public good in a larger coalition. This paper studies local public goods games with anonymous and separable group-size effect. The core is nonempty when coalition feasible sets are...

We study how individuals divide themselves into coalitions and choose a public alternative for each coalition. When preferences have consecutive support and coalition feasible sets are positively population-responsive, the proposed consecutive benevolence solution generates allocations belonging...

This paper surveys implementation theory when players have incomplete or asymmetric information, especially in economic environments. After the basic problem is introduced, the theory of implementation is summarized. Some coalitional considerations for implementation problems are discussed. For...

We study the object allocation problem and present two new characterizations of ordinal efficiency in terms of supports of random assignments. Our main characterization provides a link between ex-post and ordinal efficiency

This paper defines the concept of feedback Kant-Nash equilibrium for a discrete-time model of resource exploitation by infinitely-lived Kantian and Nashian players, where we define Kantian agents as those who act in accordance with the categorical imperative. We revisit a well-known dynamic...

The Shapley-Shubik index was designed to evaluate the power distribution in committee systems drawing binary decisions and is one of the most established power indices. It was generalized to decisions with more than two levels of approval in the input and output. In the limit we have a continuum...