We examine two factors that help explain the prevalence of conflict in low-income countries: that adversaries cannot enforce long-term contracts in arms, and that open conflict alters the future strategic positions of the adversaries differently than does peace. Using an infinite horizon model,...

In many instances of potential violent or non-violent conflict the future strategic positions of adversaries are very different when there is open conflict than when there is settlement. In such environments we show that, as the future becomes more important, open conflict becomes more likely...

Meine Dissertation hat vier Kapitel. In allen Kapiteln benutze ich Wettkampfmodelle um politökonomische Fragestellungen zu untersuchen. In Kapitel 1 untersuchen ich und meine Koautorin Dana Sisak welchen Effekt öffentliche Meinungsumfragen für das Verhalten von konkurrierenden Parteien in...

We examine how the legal protection of outside shareholders and the appropriative costs that they induce influence the incentives for private firms to go public. A higher degree of protection of shareholders can increase the appropriative costs associated with the conflict between managers and...