Behavioral implementation studies implementation when agents' choices need not be rational. All existing papers of this literature, however, fail to handle a large class of choice behaviors because they rely on a well-known condition called Unanimity. This condition says, roughly speaking, that...

This innovative book models pollution mitigation as a negative externality whilst also providing desirable and useful solutions, such as establishing the triangular equivalence relationship among the Lindahl equilibrium without transfers, the Nash bargaining solution with the payoffs of the...

Inspired by the negotiations leading up to the Paris Agreement on climate change, I study a bargaining game where every party is proposing only its own contribution, before the set of pledges must be unanimously approved. I show that, with uncertain tolerance for delay, each equilibrium pledge...

1. The origins : a bit of history -- 2. What is a game? -- 3. Solving a game -- 4. Understanding economics -- 5. Repeated games and collusive behaviour -- 6. Understanding politics -- 7. Wargames -- 8. Trade, security and hegemony -- 9. The role of information -- 10. Bargaining and cooperation.

This paper develops a search model with heterogeneous workers, firms, and on-the-job search. Employed low-skilled workers are allowed to seek better paid jobs at high productivity firms. Low productivity firms make take-it-or-leave-it wage offers, whereas high productivity firms use Nash...