Game theoretic analysis of queueing systems is an important research direction of queueing theory. In this paper, we study the service rate control problem of closed Jackson networks from a game theoretic perspective. The payoff function consists of a holding cost and an operating cost. Each...

A jury has to choose the winner of a contest. There exists a deserving winner, whose identity is common knowledge among the jurors, but not known by the planner. Jurors may be biased in favor (friend) or against (enemy) some contestants. We study conditions on the confi?guration of the jury so...

We consider strategic games where strategy sets are linearly ordered while the preferences of the players are described by binary relations. All restrictions imposed on the preferences are satisfied in the case of epsilon-optimization of a bounded-above utility function. A Nash equilibrium...

Like in the film Field of Dreams, the sentence “if you build it, he will come” also applies in power systems. In this sense, if a transmission planner suggests building some lines in anticipation of generation capacity investments, then it can induce generation companies to invest in a more...

A comprehensive theory of large strategic games with (socioeconomic and biological) traits (LSGT) has recently been presented in Khan et al. (2012, 2013), and we present a reformulation pertaining to large distributional games with traits (LDGT).

This paper studies the von Neumann–Morgenstern (vNM) stable sets for the mixed extension of 2×2 games when only single profitable deviations are allowed. We show that games with a strict Nash equilibrium have infinite vNM stable sets, and games without a strict Nash equilibrium have just a...

In this note, I derive the asymptotic relation verified by oligopolists' iso-profit curves within Cournot's game. Thereafter, I provide an economic rationale for such a mathematical relation. The results of this exploration suggest that for each firm the asymptotes of the iso-profit curves...

In this paper, we introduce the weak and the strong notions of partially honest agents (Dutta and Sen, 2012), and then study implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms (Saijo et al., 1996, 1999) in pure exchange economies with three or more agents in which pure-consequentialistically...

Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) provides an elegant game-theoretic model of an economy with one private good and one public good. Strategies of players consist of voluntary contributions of the private good to public good production. Without relying on first order conditions, the authors...

This paper contains a game-theoretic model describing the behaviour of investors at a stock exchange. The model presented is developed to reect the actual market microstructure. The players constitute a non-uniform continuum, differing, among others, by the planning horizon, the external ow of...