This paper develops a dynamic evolutionary model in which agents make choices on the basis of relative performance criteria. We distinguish two classes of learned behavior: imitative dynamics and a new class of dynamics, "introspective dynamics." Under imitative dynamics, agents compare payoffs...

Main objects here are normal-form games, featuring uncertainty and noncooperative players who entertain local visions, form local approximations, and hesitate in making large, swift adjustments. For the purpose of reaching Nash equilibrium, or learning such play, we advocate and illustrate an...

In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to understand how to play games of incomplete information under private values. The conclusions depend on whether players interact within a fixed set (fixed matching) or they are...

We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing a game. In this procedure, players depart from their current play with probabilities that are proportional to measures of regret for not having used other strategies (these measures are updated every period). It is shown that our adaptive...

This paper provides sufficient and partially necessary conditions for the equivalence of Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in symmetric games played by finite populations. The focus is on symmetric equilibria in pure strategies. The conditions are based on properties of the payoff function that...

The preemptive role of capital is analysed in a class of two-player symmetric capital accumulation differential games with reversible investment. It is proved that, in the medium run, the firm with better initial condition exploits its advantage when the game features feedback substituability....

We illustrate one way in which a population of boundedly rational individuals can learn to play an approximate Nash equilibrium. Players are assumed to make strategy choices using a combination of imitation and innovation. We begin by looking at an imitation dynamic and provide conditions under...

This paper extends models of renewable resources to an economy with two sectors, resource extraction and production. In contrast to one sector models, we show that the optimal strategies in the single-firm model are essentially different from those in the two-player model. In the single-player...

We use co-evolutionary genetic algorithms to model the players' learning process in several Cournot models, and evaluate them in terms of their convergence to the Nash Equilibrium. The ``social-learning'' versions of the two co-evolutionary algorithms we introduce, establish Nash Equilibrium in...