Showing 91 - 100 of 7,813
The paper analyzes the Nash equilibria of two-person discounted repeated games with one-sided incomplete information and known own payoffs. If the informed player is arbitrarily patient relative to the uninformed player, then the characterization for the informed player's payoffs is essentially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550893
Consider Becker's (1973) classic static matching model, with output a stochastic function of unobserved types. Assume symmetric incomplete information about types, and thus commonly observed Bayesian posteriors. Matching is then assortative in these `reputations' if expected output is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550894
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550895
This paper analyzes sequential games of double-sided Bertrand competition in the deposit and credit markets, when banks are free to reject customers and cannot distinguish among borrowers. The timing of competition is crucial when customers apply once. Interest rates are pushed upwards when the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550896
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550897
This paper discusses the structure of the Internet connectivity market by focusing on the business relations of stakeholders involved in network services provision. We believe that the role of information asymmetry is critical when considering interconnection agreements, and should be taken into...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550898
A model of dynamic risk sharing is constructed where agents meet pairwise and at random, and there is private information about endowments. Risk sharing is accomplished through dynamic contracts involving credit transactions, and through monetary exchange. A Friedman rule is optimal, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550899
The mechanism by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) for NTU games is generalized so that a coalition structure among players is taken into account. The new mechanism yields the Owen value for TU games with coalition structure as well as the consistent value (Maschler and Owen 1989, 1992) for NTU games...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550900
We present a new methodology for studying the problem of labor contracting within a firm's boundaries where contracts provide only a minimal commitment to wages and employment. Given the peculiar contractual incompleteness of labor contracts, the resulting wages and profits under an interesting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550901
This paper presents a micro-model of knowledge creation through the interactions among a group of people. Our model incorporates two key aspects of the cooperative process of knowledge creation: (i) heterogeneity of people in their state of knowledge is essential for successful cooperation in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550902