spurious labels, the government needs to supplement the labelling policy with costly monitoring activities. We find that …

free-riding, which are often ignored in the literature. We derive the optimal monitoring mechanism and show that it solves … “assignment problem,” which, coupled with the need to generate incentive for monitoring, prevents the optimal monitoring mechanism … for the success of monitoring is whether monitors can be penalized for false reporting. Without this assumption monitoring …

might play a role. My paper provides a testbed for experimental testing of anti-corruption measures and adds evidence to the …

We analyze a corruption model where a principal seeks to control an agent’s corruption by supplementing a costless … overall costs, made up of enforcement costs and social costs of corruption. If the penalties on the corrupt agent and a …

detection and one without. It turns out that monitoring reduces corruption through deterrence; at the same time, it destroys the …This paper reports on an experiment of corruption that was conducted in two treatments: one with the possibility of … intrinsic motivation for honesty. Thus the net effect on overall corruption is a priori undetermined. We show that the salary …

of monitoring a bureau. Following Mueller (1989), the bureau does not make take-it-or-leave-it budget proposals to the …

corruption in professional sumo. In the present paper, we update Duggan and Levitt's study to take into account changes since … January 2000. We find strong statistical evidence that corruption is reduced after January 2000 but reappears in the period …

In this paper, I analyze the effects of monitoring on an agent’s incentives in a two-period principal-agent model in … output; when she monitors the agent’s effort choice; and when she monitors the agent’s corruptibility. I find that monitoring … of effort improves the sorting of types but it might also give the agent more incentive to be corrupt. Monitoring of …

corruption in professional sumo. In the present article, the authors update the study of Duggan and Levitt to take into account … changes since January 2000. The authors find strong statistical evidence that corruption is reduced after January 2000 but …