We prove here the existence of a value (of norm 1) on the spaces ′N A and even ′A N, the closure in the variation distance of the linear space spanned by all games f∘μ, where μ is a non-atomic, non-negative finitely additive measure of mass 1 and f a real-valued function on [0,1] which...

We introduce a model of communication with dynamic state of nature. We rely on entropy as a measure of information, characterize the set of expected empirical distributions that are achievable. We present applications to games with and without common interests.Classification JEL : C61, C73, D82.

Let G=<I,J,g> be a two-person zero-sum game. We examine the two-person zero-sum repeated game G(k,m) in which players 1 and 2 place down finite state automata with k,m states respectively and the payoff is the average per-stage payoff when the two automata face off. We are interested in the cases in...</i,j,g>

We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better-informed player can communicate some or all of his information to the other. Our model covers costly and&sol;or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium...

Let G = (I,J,g) be a two-person zero-sum game. We examine the two-person zero-sum repeated game G(k,m) in which player 1 and 2 place down finite state automata with k,m states respectively and the payoff is the average per stage payoff when the two automata face off. We are interested in the...