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How delegation improves commitment
Perino, Grischa - 2008
We often use delegation as a commitment device if a government faces problems of timeinconsistency. McCallum (1995, AER … P&P) challenged this practice, claiming that delegation merely relocates the commitment problem but does not solve it …. In a model where delegation and specific policies are subject to the same commitment technology it is shown that McCallum …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003747341
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How Delegation Improves Commitment
Perino, Grischa - 2008
We often use delegation as a commitment device if a government faces problems of timeinconsistency. McCallum (1995, AER … P&P) challenged this practice, claiming that delegation merely relocates the commitment problem but does not solve it …. In a model where delegation and specific policies are subject to the same commitment technology it is shown that McCallum …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422169
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How Delegation Improves Commitment
Perino, Grischa - Alfred-Weber-Institut für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, … - 2008
We often use delegation as a commitment device if a government faces problems of timeinconsistency. McCallum (1995, AER … P&P) challenged this practice, claiming that delegation merely relocates the commitment problem but does not solve it …. In a model where delegation and specific policies are subject to the same commitment technology it is shown that McCallum …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005200597
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Trade, Self-Governance,and the Provision of Law and Order, with an Application To Medieval English Chartered Towns
Angelucci, Charles; Meraglia, Simone - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) - 2013
instead low delegation never occurs. Our theory provides a rationale for the case of post-Norman Conquest England (1066 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010823110
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Standardization and Markets : Just Exactly Who is the Government, and Why Should Antitrust Care?
Sagers, Chris - 2011
We take for granted that the basic choice in public policy is between allocation of resources by government bureaucracy, on the one hand, or allocation by markets, on the other. But that dichotomy is false, and at least under contemporary circumstances it is more accurate to describe the choice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013129284
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Politics and Monetary Policy
Ehrmann, Michael; Fratzscher, Marcel - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
How and why do politicians’ preferences about monetary policy differ from the interest rates set by independent central banks? Looking at the European Central Bank, the paper shows that politicians, on average, favor significantly lower interest rates. Three factors explain the different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008784739
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Organizing for Synergies
Dessein, Wouter; Garicano, Luis; Gertner, Robert - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
Multi-product firms create value by integrating functional activities such as manufacturing across business units. This integration often requires making functional managers responsible for implementing standardization, thereby limiting business-unit managers’ authority. Realizing synergies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114409
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The Origins of Democracy : A Model with Application to Ancient Greece
Fleck, Robert K.; Hanssen, F. Andrew - 2002
This paper seeks to provide an improved understanding of the origins of democracy. It begins by developing a theoretical model to demonstrate how exogenous economic conditions can influence both the incentives to establish democratic institutions and the likelihood that such institutions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014112734
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Delegation Versus Centralization: The Role of Externalities
Currarini, Sergio; Feri, Francesco - Dipartimento di Economia, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia - 2006
We study a simple contracting game with a principal and two agents. Contracts exert an externalities on non contractors. The principal can either contract both agents in a centralized manner, or delegate one agent to contract the other. We show that the choice of the principal depends on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005057162
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Preventing Collusion through Discretion
Felli, Leonardo; Hortala-Vallve, Rafael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
of a collusive agreement a party has to incur to walk away from such a side deal. Delegation is then a simple way for the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008873329