Cooperation does not easily scale up—strategic uncertainty increases as groups get larger, preventing coordination on the cooperative equilibrium. In an indefinitely repeated social dilemma experiment conducted in small and large groups, we add partial cooperation choices to the usual rigid...

We study a decentralized trading model as in Peters (1984), where a finite number of heterogeneous capacity-constrained sellers compete for a finite number of homogeneous buyers, by posting prices. This "directed search" model is known to admit symmetric equilibria; yet, uniqueness has proved...

We claim that Posner's nuisance rule maintains the efficiency feature even under severe informational asymmetry. This paper, as a critical assessment of an overly complicated order-reporting mechanism by Kim [2002], argues that Posner's original value-reporting mechanism alone is enough to...

The literature on excess entry shows that the free-entry equilibrium number of firms may be greater than is socially optimal, and proposes government entry regulation as a remedy. This article tries to show that such a policy recommendation is misleading. A two-period, three-person entry game...

This paper is about limit pricing under complete information and endogenous market demands. If pre-entry and post-entry market demands are correlated, then limit pricing can be an equilibrium strategy under complete information without government intervention. Furthermore, with government...

This paper analyzes the signaling nature of litigation selection under asymmetric information. For the robustness of the analysis, we separate the litigation selection process, where the signaling from the informed party plays the key role, from the actual settlement where a more general...

This paper analyzes the non-dichotomy nature of the entry and the price regulations under asymmetric information. When current market is a monopoly and there is a potential entrant, the government should make decisions both on the monopoly (price) regulation and on the entry regulation...

This paper studies the signaling role of the litigation/settlement selection under asymmetric information. As an attempt to improve existing asymmetric information theory, we separate litigation/settlement selection process and the actual settlement bargaining process, and adopt an infinitely...

Excess entry theorem, which shows that the free market can generate too many firms, is a theoretic base for entry regulation. When the current market is a monopoly, entry is considered as excessive if the social welfare under the post-entry Cournot-Nash equilibrium, net of entry coast, is lower...

We study a decentralized trading model as in Peters (1984), where heterogeneous market participants face a trade-o between price and trade probability. We present a novel proof of existence of a unique demand vector in Nash equilibrium, based on a recursive approach that exploits the...