Most of the work in the field of competition between jurisdictions for the attraction of a large plant focuses on financial offers, bids or tax holidays. In this paper we add to the competition game an initial stage in which jurisdictions can invest in an infrastructure capital to enhance their...

Participants in a market, buyers and sellers, may need the service of an intermediary who will put them into contact and give them information about their potential trading partner. The intermediary chooses what price it will charge to each side to have access to its service. It also chooses...

We examine a Bertrand competition game between two intermediaries offering matching services between two sides of a market. Indirect network externalities arise as the probability of finding one's match with a given intermediary increase with the number of agents of the other side who use the...

We examine the effect of bilateral trade in a concentrated industry under Cournot competition, when firms are regulated by national agencies who care about national social welfare. We allow for differences in costs and market sizes and for asymmetric information between regulatory agencies and...

In the context of a stationary economy, where markets for long-lived real assets open periodically, we analyze the welfare effect of the information structure. At each period, agents receive a signal related to the future dividends of assets. Whenever the quality of the information increases,...