This paper proves a new folk theorem for repeated games with private monitoring and communication, extending the idea of delayed communication in Compte [O. Compte, Communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring, Econometrica 66 (1998) 597-626] to the case where private...

We analyze the infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma with imperfect private monitoring and discounting. The main contribution of this paper is to construct ``belief-based'' strategies, where a player's continuation strategy is a function only of his beliefs. This simplifies the analysis...

By allocating dierent information to team members, secret contracts can provide better incentives to perform with an intuitive organizational design. For instance, they may help to monitor monitors, and appoint secret principals. Generally, secret contracts highlight a rich duality between...

A repeated game with private monitoring is “close” to a repeated game with public monitoring (or perfect monitoring) when (i) the expected payoff structures are close and (ii) the informational structures are close in the sense that private signals in the private monitoring game can be...

This paper studies repeated partnership games with only two public signals, the game studied in Radner Myerson and Maskin(1986) except that the stage game is discrete. It is well known that the public perfect equilibrium (PPE) payoff set is bounded away from the efficient frontier in this class...