We consider non-cooperative multilateral bargaining games with endogenous bargaining protocols. Under an endogenous protocol, the probability with which a player becomes the proposer in a round of bargaining depends on the identity of the player who previously rejected. An important example is...

We study a process of bargaining over social outcomes represented by points in the unit interval. The identity of the proposer is determined by a general Markov process and the acceptance of a proposal requires the approval of it by all the players. We show that for every value of the discount...

The paper studies the model of multilateral bargaining over the alternatives represented by points in the m-dimensional Euclidean space. Proposers are chosen randomly and the acceptance of a proposal requires the unanimous approval of it by all the players. The focus of the paper is on the...

We study a model of multilateral bargaining over social outcomes represented by points in the unit interval. The acceptance or rejection of a proposal is determined by an acceptance rule as represented by the collection of decisive coalitions. The focus of the paper is on the asymptotic behavior...

We study a process of bargaining over alternatives represented by points in the unit interval. The paper focuses on the asymptotic behavior of the subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies as the continuation probability approaches one. We give a complete characterization of the limit...

I consider n-person normal form games where the strategy set of each player is a non-empty compact convex subset of an Euclidean space, and the payoff function of player i is continuous in joint strategies and continuously differentiable and concave in the player i's strategy. No further...

The seminal contribution of Debreu-Scarf (1963) connects the two concepts of core and competitive equilibrium in exchange economies. In effect, their core-equilibrium equivalence result states that, when the set of economic agents is replicated, the set of core allocations of the replica economy...

This note provides a new proof of the non-emptiness of the fuzzy core in a pure exchange economy with finitely many agents. The proof is based on the concept of <InlineEquation ID="Equ2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$(\Pi, \beta)$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>-balanced core for games without side payments due to Bonnisseau and Iehlé (2003). Copyright Springer-Verlag...</equationsource></inlineequation>