agreement. I obtain that collusion is easier to sustain the larger the cartel is. Then, I explore the implications of this …, they risk that collusion completely collapses, as remaining cartel members are unable to sustain collusion. …The paper studies how does the size of a cartel affect the possibility that its members can sustain a collusive …

We discuss the implications of a Stackelberg sequence of play between a cartel and the fringe. We consider two … different approaches to collusion: (i) one-stage static model and (ii) a multi-period oligopoly model. Our main result is that … in the static model with quantity-setting firms a stable cartel only exist when cartel firms behave as a Stackelberg …

We analyze how the size of a cartel affects the possibility to sustain a collusive agreement. We develop a multi …) firms choose their output levels noncooperatively. We show that, in our model, collusion is easier to sustain the larger the … cartel is. The implications of this result on the incentives of firms to participate in a cartel are analyzed. We obtain that …

our model, an increase in the number of cartel firms may increase collusion likelihood by diminishing the negative effects …In this paper we investigate the connection between the number of competitors and the sustainability of collusion … for collusion of the existence of a competitive fringe. Also, we show that an increase in the number of fringe firrms …

the link between overt collusion and price dispersion. Formal theories and observation of cartel behavior suggest that …While there are suggestions in applied cartel studies that price dispersion changes when cartelization of a market …

We investigate the effect of a ban on third-degree price discrimination on the sustainability of collusion. We build a …' discount factor has to be higher in order to sustain collusion in grim-trigger strategies under price discrimination than under …

less inclined to collude than men when collusion harms a third party. No gender difference can be found in the absence of a … distance is small they hardly behave collusively when collusion harms a third party. …

While price-fixing cartel prosecutions have received significant attention, the policy determinants and the political ….S. antitrust cartel prosecutions during the period 1969-2013. This period has seen substantive policy innovations with increasing … penalties related to fines and jail terms. There appear to be four distinct cartel policy regimes: pre-1978, 1978-1992, 1993 …

. Patient firms can support optimal collusion at the monopoly price. For less patient firms, monopoly prices must be punctuated …