On endogenous cartel size under tacit collusion
Year of publication: |
2008
|
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Authors: | Escrihuela-Villar, Marc |
Published in: |
Investigaciones Economicas. - Fundación SEPI. - Vol. 32.2008, 3, p. 325-338
|
Publisher: |
Fundación SEPI |
Subject: | Collusion | partial cartels | trigger strategies | optimal punishment |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Type of publication: | Article |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Published |
Classification: | L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure Size; Size Distribution of Firms ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection |
Source: |
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