We develop a monetary model with flexible supply of labor, cash in advance constraints and government spending financed by seignorage. This model has two regimes. One regime is conventional with two steady states. The other regime has a unique steady state which can be determinate or...

In this paper we analyze the interaction of two disciplinary mechanisms: competition and reputation. We first study a dynamic model of monopolistic competition with experienced goods (i.e., quality is observed after goods are purchased). When market power is high enough, reputation results in...

In U.S. elections, voters often vote for candidates from different parties for president and Congress. Voters also express dissatisfaction with the performance of Congress as a whole and satisfaction with their own representative. The authors develop a model of split-ticket voting in which...

Over the last three decades there has been a dramatic increase in the size of the financial sector and in the compensation of financial executives. This increase has been associated with greater risk-taking and the use of more complex financial instruments. Parallel to this trend, the...

We study how competition from privately supplied currency substitutes affects monetary equilibria. Whenever currency is inefficiently provided, inside money competition plays a disciplinary role by providing an upper bound on equilibrium inflation rates. Furthermore, if "inside monies" can be...

Presentation of some new results showing how, under very general conditions, the recursive saddle-point method, pioneered by Marcet and Marimon, delivers the appropriate solution for contracting problems with intertemporal incentive constraints, with or without unique solutions. These results...