This paper studies the role of social policies in different European welfare states regarding minimum income protection and active inclusion. The core focus lies on crisis resilience, i.e. the capacity of social policy arrangements to contain poverty and inequality and avoid exclusion before,...

This paper studies the role and performance of social policies in different European welfare states regarding minimum income protection during periods of crisis. To achieve this goal, the paper expands its analytical focus to include other tiers of social protection, in particular upstream...

We combine a high-frequency survey on job search effort with administrative data on caseworker interactions from the German unemployment insurance system to estimate how the dynamics of search effort respond to caseworker meetings and vacancy referrals. Meetings alone do not increase...

Approximately 10 percent of Unemployment Insurance (UI) claimants in the United States are denied benefits after being deemed at-fault for their job loss by a government examiner. Using administrative data from California and an examiner leniency design, we estimate the causal effects of...

In talent-intensive jobs, workers' quality is revealed by their performance. This enhances productivity and earnings, but also increases layoff risk. Firms cannot insure workers against this risk if they compete fiercely for talent. In this case, the more risk-averse workers will choose less...

We derive the shape of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) contracts when agents can exert search effort but face different search costs and have private information about their type. We derive a recursive solution of our dynamic adverse selection problem with repeated moral hazard. Conditions...

We study entrepreneurs’ behavioral responses of effort (moral hazard) to avoid business failure.This is done in the context of an unemployment insurance scheme for self-employed, wherewe estimate how much of the transition probability to unemployment can be causally attributedto being insured....

We study the existence of a profitable unemployment insurance market in a dynamic economy with adverse selection rooting in information on future job losses. The new feature of the model is that the insurer and workers interact repeatedly. Repeated interactions make it possible to threaten...

The benefits of implementing Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts (UISAs) are studied in the presence of the multiple sources of information frictions often existing in developing countries. A benchmark incomplete markets economy is calibrated to Mexico in the early 2000s. The unconstrained...

In this paper, I explore how optimal aggregate dynamics can be shaped by the presence of moral hazard in unemployment insurance. I also analyze the optimal provision of unemployment insurance and the implications for the amount of cross-sectional heterogeneity. The economy that I consider embeds...