In initial cross-section estimates using data from the 1991-94 British Household Panel Study, the authors find that union members had lower overall job satisfaction than non-union members, and public sector workers had higher satisfaction than private sector workers. Controlling for individual...

This paper is the first to examine the welfare consequences of foreign competition in a mixed oligopoly set in a linear model of spatial price discrimination. It demonstrates that the entry of a foreign firm often lowers domestic welfare. This results because the public firm locates largely...

We show that partially privatizing a public firm alters underlying conjectures, in turn, changing the optimal degree of privatization. The consistent conjectures equilibrium (CCE) generates substantially greater optimal privatization than does any conjecture shared between the firms including...

Previous research examining mixed duopolies shows that the use of an optimal incentive contract for the public firm increases welfare and that privatization reduces welfare. We demonstrate that these results do not generalize to a mixed oligopoly with multiple private firms. We derive the...

The paper presents a spatial model in which a foreign firm and local government behave strategically in setting a local equity requirement (LER). Contrary to simple intuition, larger equity requirements may increase economic efficiency, but this conclusion is highly sensitive to the vertical...

This is the first paper to consider a mixed oligopoly in which a public Stackelberg leader competes with both domestic and foreign private firms. The welfare maximising leader is shown to always produce less than under previous Cournot conjectures. Introducing leadership also alters previous...

Theory presents two channels through which profit sharing can cause workers to increase their coworkers' productivity: greater cooperation and increased peer pressure. This paper argues that these generate opposite influences on coworker relations, and that which dominates varies according to...

A government authority regulates an upstream monopolist only if there is a sufficient welfare increase to justify doing so. A downstream firm strategically increases costs in order to force regulation upstream. The decision to regulate increases profit downstream, reduces profit upstream and...