This work provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the dominance solvability of approval voting games. Our conditions are very simple since they are based on the approval relation, a binary relation between the alternatives. We distinguish between two sorts of dominance solvability and...

Approval Voting is shown to be the unique scoring rule that leads strategic voters to sincere behavior of three candidates elections in Poisson Games. However, Approval Voting can lead to insincere behavior in elections with more than three candidates.

In this paper,we show how to recover discrete-time models from their continuous-time versions through Euler discretizations. In the first part, we introduce general polynomial discretizations in backward and forward looking and we study the preservation of stability properties and local...

The rise of visual representation in economics textbooks after WWII is one of the main features of contemporary economics. In this paper, we argue that this development has been preceded by a no less significant rise of visual representation in the larger literature devoted to social and...