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Collective choice with heterogeneous time preferences

Pakhnin, Mikhail - In: Journal of economic surveys 37 (2023) 3, pp. 715-746

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014337963

Mathematics and Democracy : Recent Advances in Voting Systems and Collective Choice

Simeone, Bruno (contributor); … - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013520567

How democracy resolves conflict in difficult games

Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

Democracy resolves conflicts in difficult games like Prisoners’ Dilemma and Chicken by stabilizing their cooperative outcomes. It does so by transforming these games into games in which voters are presented with a choice between a cooperative outcome and a Pareto-inferior noncooperative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835685

Voting by Committees

Barbera, Salvador; Sonnenschein, Hugo; Zhou, Lin - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1990

. The voters must choose a subset of K. We define a class of voting schemes called voting by committees. The main result of … the paper is a characterization of voting by committees, which is the class of all voting schemes that satisfy voter … Groves and Clarke scheme in that it characterizes all of the non-manipulable voting schemes on an important domain. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762679

The merits of Neo-Downsian modeling of the alternative vote: A reply to Horowitz

Fraenkel, Jon; Grofman, Bernard - In: Public Choice 133 (2007) 1, pp. 1-11

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005809316

AGGREGATION AND SOCIAL CHOICE: A MEAN VOTER THEOREM

CAPLIN, A.; NALEBUFF, B. - Department of Economics, School of Arts and Sciences - 1989

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005811999

Evaluating the Degree of Manipulability of Certain Aggregation Procedures under Multiple Choices

Aleskerov, Fuad; Karabekyan, Daniel; Sanver, Remzi; … - In: Journal of the New Economic Association (2009) 1-2, pp. 37-61

The problem of manipulation in voting is studied in the case of multi-valued choice. Well-known and new schemes of … voting procedures allowing multi-valued choices. The results obtained are presented for five voting rules. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008526686

Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem

Caplin, Andrew; Nalebuff, Barry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1990

A celebrated result of Black (1984a) demonstrates the existence of a simple majority winner when preferences are single-peaked. The social choice follows the preferences of the median voter's most preferred outcome beats any alternative. However, this conclusion does not extend to elections in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593158

Voting Procedures

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter - C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Department of … - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005611680

Dividing One Euro, Democratically.

Laslier, J.-F.; Picard, N. - Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. - 1999

In this paper, concepts from the theory of electoral competition are applied to the classical problem of dividing one unit of a homogeneous good. If the Uncovered set selects almost all divisions, other concepts (Minimal Covering set, Bipartisan set) predict that very unequal divisions are not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005618908