This study investigates the excess funds hypothesis using samples of special dividends, regular dividend increases, and self-tender offers. All three types of firms tend to have funds in excess of industry norms before the events. The excess funds are largely non-recurring for special dividend...

Consistent with the notion that dividends are very sticky, Daniel, Denis, and Naveen (2008) report evidence that firms manage earnings upward when pre-managed earnings are expected to fall short of dividend payments. However, we find that this evidence is not robust when controlling for firms'...

We examine how directors with investment banking experience affect a firm's acquisition behavior. We find that the presence of investment banker directors is associated with a higher probability of subsequent acquisitions, and such positive relation is not driven by reverse causality. Focusing...

Firms that undertake corporate events often exhibit atypical financial characteristics, such that future performance might be expected to change even before the event is announced. I investigate five methods for generating control samples in various sampling situations. The results indicate that...

We examine the impact of social networks when they are likely to be most valuable. We find that firms well-connected to other firms through executives and directors have better performance and more investments during the 2007-2009 financial crisis, and this is especially true among financially...

We challenge a common presumption that poison pills and two Delaware case rulings in 1995 validating such pills materially entrench firms. Based on unsolicited takeover attempts from 1985 to 2009, we find that poison pills enhance takeover premiums, but do not reduce completion rates....

We find evidence that labor unions affect CEO compensation. First, we find that firms with strong unions pay their CEOs less. The negative effect is robust to various tests for endogeneity, including cross-sectional variations and a regression discontinuity design. Second, we find that CEO...

We study the effect of trust on debt contracting. We find that, after the revelation of option backdating, borrowers that likely backdated their previous option grants pay higher interest rates on loans. This adverse effect is mitigated by CEO replacements. Conversely, we find no impact on the...

We report that the probability that executives exercise options early decreases with the volatility of the underlying stock return. We interpret this to mean that executives' subjective option value increases with volatility and that option grants increase executives' risk appetite. Further...

We document that the likelihood of asset sales increases with union presence and union wages. Furthermore, acquiring firms gain significant concessions from the incumbent union following asset sales. Finally, the anticipation of union concessions helps explain the excess stock returns around...