We establish the precise connections between progressive taxation and inequality reduction, in a setting where the level of tax revenue to be raised is exogenously fixed and tax schemes are balanced. We show that, in contrast with the traditional literature on taxation, the equivalence between...

We model problems of allocating disputed properties as generalized exchange economies in which agents have preferences and claims over multiple goods, and the social endowment of each good may not be sufficient to satisfy all individual claims. In this context, we investigate procedural and...

Abstract We offer a rationality foundation of majority voting on two restricted domains of individual preferences proposed by Inada (1964). One is the domain consisting of (dichotomous) preferences that have at most two indifference classes, and the other is the domain where any set of three...

In the model of group identification, Samet and Schmeidler (J Econ Theory 110:213–233, <CitationRef CitationID="CR5">2003</CitationRef>) provide two axiomatic characterizations of the“liberal” decision rule (a person is socially qualified as a member of a collective if and only if he qualifies himself). They impose standard...</citationref>

We provide alternative axiomatic characterizations of the extended egalitarian rules (Moreno-Ternero and Roemer, Econometrica 74:1419–1427, <CitationRef CitationID="CR9">2006</CitationRef>) in a fixed-population setting of the canonical resource allocation model based on individual capabilities (output functions). Our main axioms are...</citationref>

We study allocation rules that are robust to coalitional manipulation by transferring, merging, or splitting individual characteristics among coalition partners (e.g. merging or splitting claims in bankruptcy problems). Coalition formation is restricted by an exogenous network (a non-directed...