A set of voters consults experts before voting over two alternatives. Experts observe private signals about the values … of the alternatives and can reveal their information or conceal it, but cannot lie. We examine how disclosure and voting … vary with preference biases, signal precision, and the voting rule. Unanimity rule can lead to greater information …

We analyse committees of voters who take a decision between two options as a two- stage process. In a discussion stage …, voters share non-verifiable information about a private signal concerning what is the best option. In a voting stage, votes …

We analyse committees of voters who take a decision between two options as a two- stage process. In a discussion stage …, voters share non-verifiable information about a private signal concerning what is the best option. In a voting stage, votes …

voting. Under influence, these decisions can become inefficient. Therefore, the market for policies may be more likely to …, and payoff and information structures. We discuss implications for the efficiency of democracy, voting, lobbying …

committees benefits from voting insincerely accrue not only when a decision maker's vote is pivotal. As the number of voters …Some committees convene behind closed doors while others publicly discuss issues and make their decisions. This paper … increases, the cost of voting insincerely declines in an open committee because the probability of being pivotal declines. This …

voting outcome in period t becomes the status quo in period t+1. We study symmetric Markov equilibria of the resulting game … alternative, and the discount factor (committee impatience). We report several new findings. Voting behavior is selfish and myopic …

voting outcome in period t becomes the status quo in period t+1. We study symmetric Markov equilibria of the resulting game … alternative, and the discount factor (committee "impatience"). We report several new findings. Voting behavior is selfish and …

can mitigate time inconsistency by introducing a status quo bias. When voting institutions (ie. the committee`s … committee to make decisions through voting is that a commitment device can be created out of it, without totally renouncing … flexibility to respond to unexpected contingenices. Appropriate voting procedures and a well chosen supermajority rule can make a …

. In this paper policies are negotiated in a committee by playing a dynamic voting game. The implications of this change …