This study investigates in a two-stage two-player model how the decision to make an ultimatum and how much to demand depends on the impatience of the agents and the pie uncertainty. First, players simultaneously decide on their ultimatums. If the ultimatum(s) are compatible then the player(s)...

The Mekong River is the major water source in Southeast Asia and shared by six countries. There is a rush to acquire sources of alternative energy and other benefits to meet the growing demand for water and energy, while China and Myanmar have refused to cooperate fully in the Mekong River...

Selfish, strategic players may benefit from cooperation, provided they reach agreement. It is therefore important to construct mechanisms that facilitate such cooperation, especially in the case of asymmetric private information. The two major issues are: (1) singling out a fair and efficient...

We apply farsighted stable set to two versions of Hotelling's location games: one with linear market and another with circular market. It is shown that there always exists a farsighted stable set in both games. In particular, the set of all location profiles that yields equal payoff across all...

This paper extends the Cournot-Shapiro model to provide a tractable model of voluntary patent pool formation among standard essential patent holders. We assume that patent holders have complementary patents for a standard. We first show that the existence of a path of voluntary patent pool...

This article reviews papers about gender differences in trust and reciprocity. The literature about experimental trust games finds striking gender differences in participants' reciprocal behavior. Most papers report that female first movers in trust games trust less than male ones. In trust...

The paper studies when efficient allocations are implementable via coalition-proof mechanisms. When ambiguous mechanisms are allowed and agents are maxmin expected utility maximizers, we prove that all efficient allocations are implementable via interim coalition incentive compatible mechanisms...

The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value provides an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats against...

The purpose is to discuss, using examples, issues in game theory which have been occasionally discussed and not always fully. There has been intense research and progress in academic journal and specialized volumes, but there is scope for a simple analysis of the basic ideas through further...