We present a dynamic duopoly model of technical innovation where R&D costs decrease exogenously with time, and inter-firm knowledge spillover lowers the second comer's R&D cost. The spillover effect only becomes available after a disclosure lag. These features allow us to identify a new type of...

A wider RJV extension hastens process innovations at the cost of increasing collusion in the final market. In a Cournot model, an extended RJV is welfare enhancing only when the Antitrust Authority is strong, so that the increase in distortion is limited, and when the size of the technical...

This paper analyses the potentially defensive behaviour of patent-race winners and the ensuing effect on aggregate R&D effort. We propose a quality-ladder model where leaders strategically acquire a technology advantage and are able to innovate. In this context, product-market regulation, by...

We develop a dynamic duopoly, in which firms have to take into account a technological externality, which reduces their innovation costs over time, and an inter-firm spillover, which lowers only the second comer’s R&D costs. This spillover exerts its effect after a disclosure lag. We identify...

Technical standards take such a big part in our daily life (cars, mobile phones, food and so on) that it seems to become an invisible phenomenon. The construction of these standards is mainly embedded in international arenas and networks. Scholars still know few of actors and know-how in this...

Non-R&D innovation is a common economic phenomenon, though R&D has been the central focus of policy making and scholarly research in the field of innovation. An analysis of the third European Community Innovation Survey (CIS-3) results for 15 countries finds that almost half of innovative...

Les normes techniques envahissent notre quotidien (automobile, téléphone portable, conservation des aliments) au point que leur omniprésence facilite leur invisibilité. S’il est certain que la construction de ces normes est très majoritairement internationale, il reste à savoir qui...

A wider RJV extension hastens process innovations at the cost of increasing collusion in the .nal market. In a Cournot model, an extended RJV is welfare enhancing only when the Antitrust Authority is strong, so that the increase in distortion is limited, and when the size of the technical...

We develop a dynamic duopoly, where .rms have to take into account a technological externality, that reduces over time their innovation costs, and an inter-.rm spillover, that lowers only the second comer.s R&D cost. This spillover exerts its e¤ect after a disclosure lag. We identify three...

This paper analyses the potentially defensive behaviour of patent race winners and its effect on aggregate R&D effort. It proposes a quality-ladders model that endogenously determines leaders technology advantages and who innovates. Product market regulation can have either a positive or a...