Most work on tax competition argues that mobile factors tend to be undertaxed except if there is coordination of tax policies. Full coordination is not however always feasible, and as a consequence some measures of partial coordination have been proposed such as minimal witholding taxes on...

This article contributes to the literature on local tax interactions. Its novelty lies in its focus on the interactions of local governments across national borders. We use panel data for the French and German municipalities in the Rhine Valley for the period 2000–2007. The local governments...

This paper investigates efficiency losses caused by independent tax systems and proposes ways of remedying this coordination failure Whereas the harmful effects of tariff competition have been thoroughly explored in the trade policy literature little is known about the externalities that result...

This paper examines the tax competition literature and attempts to draw out its implications for the debate on corporate tax coordination within the EU. Although corporate tax coordination, including tax rate harmonization, has been the subject of intense discussion in the European Union (EU)...

This survey summarizes the state and development of European tax policy, in particular discussing the harmonization progress in direct as well as indirect taxes. Based on an overview over the theoretical and empirical literature on tax competition, we further ask whether increased tax...

This paper shows how the distribution of the ownership of multinational companies and the labour market conditions, especially the wage formation process, influence the outcome of interjurisdictional tax competition and coordination. In particular, it sets forth that equilibrium corporate tax...

We consider a world in which countries apply optimal taxes on mobile capital and savings (like in Bucovetsky and Wilson, 1991). Firms and savers may underreport income in order to avoid or evade taxation. We show that, even in the presence of underreporting, the equilibrium under tax competition...

In a Stackelberg framework of capital income taxation it is shown that imposing a minimum tax rate that is lower than all countries' equilibrium tax rates in the non-cooperative equilibrium may reduce equilibrium tax rates in all countries.

This survey summarizes the state and development of European tax policy, in particular discussing the harmonization progress in direct as well as indirect taxes. Based on an overview over the theoretical and empirical literature on tax competition, we further ask whether increased tax...

We consider a world in which countries apply optimal taxes on mobile capital and savings (like in Bucovetsky and Wilson, 1991). Firms and savers may underreport income in order to avoid or evade taxation. We show that, even in the presence of underreporting, the equilibrium under tax competition...